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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
 
This case involves an appeal from the District Court for New 
Union Island. R. at 1. Jurisdiction was proper in the district court 
because this is a claim arising under the ATS. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 
(2018). The United States Court of Appeals for the Twelfth Circuit 
has jurisdiction over this case because it is an appeal from a final 
decision in a District Court of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
(2018). The notice of appeal was filed in a timely manner. Fed. R. 
App. 4(a). 
 
ISSUES 
 
1. Is there a ripe norm of international law that holds a domestic 
corporation liable under the Alien Tort Statute? 
 
2. Does the Trail Smelter Principle meet the high burden for 
recognition as a principle of customary international law 
enforceable as a “Law of Nations” under the Alien Tort Statute? 3.  
 
3. Assuming the Trail Smelter Principle is customary international 
law, does it impose obligations enforceable against non-
governmental actors? 
 
4. Does the Clean Air Act’s displacement of federal common law 
causes of action include Plaintiff’s Alien Tort Statute common law 
claim based on the Trail Smelter Principle? 
 
5. Does the Fifth Amendment’s substantive due process protections 
create a cause of action against the United States Government to 
protect the entire global atmospheric climate system?  
 
6. Do Plaintiffs’ public trust claim and law of nations claim under 
the Alien Tort Statute present a justiciable question that is 
properly decided by the courts? 
 
 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol10/iss1/4
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Plaintiffs Organization of Disappearing Island Nations, Apa 
Mana, and Noah Flood (“Plaintiffs”) brought this action against 
Defendant HexonGlobal Corporation (“HexonGlobal”) for a claim 
under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) and for violations of public 
trust obligations. R. at 3. Plaintiff’s suit arose from their claim that 
HexonGlobal’s fossil fuel related business activities are causing the 
sea level around A’Na Atu and New Union Islands to rise so rapidly 
that the islands will be completely uninhabitable by the end of this 
century unless action is taken to limit emissions of greenhouse 
gasses. R. at 3-4. On August 14, 2018, the District Court granted 
HexonGlobal’s motions to dismiss. R. at 11. From that order, 
Plaintiffs appeal. R. at 1. 
 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
 
Defendant HexonGlobal is an American corporation, 
incorporated in New Jersey, with its principal place of business in 
Texas. R. at 5. It is the surviving corporation resulting from the 
merger of all major United States oil producers. Id. HexonGlobal 
and its predecessors have produced and sold fossil fuels globally 
since at least the 1970s. Id. Plaintiffs Mana, Flood, and the 
Organization of Disappearing Island Nations (ODIN) filed suit 
against HexonGlobal and the United States (U.S.) alleging injuries 
from greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to global climate 
change. Id. at 3–4. Mana is a foreign national from the island 
nation of A ‘Na Atu and Flood is a U.S. citizen residing in the New 
Union Islands, a U.S. possession. Id. at 3. 
Plaintiffs allege that their homes will become uninhabitable 
as a result of seal level rise caused by global climate change. Id. at 
3–4. The damage to property and other harms cited by Plaintiffs 
have already occurred, caused by the current rise in sea levels. Id. 
at 5. Historically, the U.S. government heavily subsidized and 
encouraged the production and use of fossil fuels. Id. at 5–6. The 
U.S. is responsible for twenty percent of historical global 
emissions. Id. at 6. HexonGlobal is responsible for six percent of 
3
  
2019] RUNNER UP - BEST BRIEF 89 
 
global fossil fuel-related greenhouse gas emissions. Id. at 5. 
Though HexonGlobal and its processors were aware that emissions 
could contribute to sea level rise, the production and sale of fossil 
fuels has been legal in the U.S. for the entire time period at issue 
in Plaintiffs’ suit. Id. 
Only recently has the U.S. government enacted policies to 
limit emissions. Prior to 2007, the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”) was not directed to regulate greenhouse gasses like 
carbon dioxide as pollutants under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”). Id. 
at 6. In 2009, the EPA began promulgating regulations limiting 
emissions of greenhouse gases, including fuel efficiency standards 
for cars and trucks, technology-based standards for new power 
plants, and the “Clean Power Plan,” which limits emissions from 
existing power plants and requires states to create emissions limit 
plans. Id. at 6–7; Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. 64662, 64663-
64664 (Oct. 23, 2015) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71). 
These measures have only slightly reduced U.S. emissions. R. at 7. 
Over the same period, global emissions have increased. Id. 
The current Administration seeks to reverse many of the 
EPA’s climate regulations, complicating domestic efforts to reduce 
emissions. Id. at 7. New proposals freeze regulations for vehicle 
fuel efficiency and repeal the Clean Power Plan. Id. at 7–8. 
President Trump also announced the U.S. will withdraw from the 
Paris Agreement, the most recent multilateral effort to commit 
countries to nationally-determined emissions reduction targets. Id. 
at 7. U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement becomes effective 
in 2020. Id. 
Plaintiff Mana seeks damages and injunctive relief under the 
Alien Tort Statute alleging injury from the impacts of climate 
change and sea level rise. Id. at 8. Mana claims production and sale 
of fossil fuels contributes to transboundary harms and creates 
liability for companies like HexonGlobal. Id. Plaintiff Flood brings 
suit against the U.S. government for its historical support for fossil 
fuels and for its failure to take action to limit greenhouse gas 
emissions. Id. at 10. Flood alleges the federal government has 
violated his Fifth Amendment substantive due process right 
against government deprivation of life, liberty, and property based 
on the public trust doctrine. Id. 
 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol10/iss1/4
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 
First, an Alien Tort Statute (ATS) claim cannot be brought 
against a domestic corporation, as corporate liability is not a ripe 
or universal norm under customary international law. Following 
the guidance of traditional sources and Supreme Court dicta, no 
norm of corporate liability has been internationally incorporated 
so as to be customary international law. Imposing domestic 
corporate liability directly opposes the Supreme Court’s emphasis 
on a cautionary approach and causes practical issues in the 
evaluation and consistent application of corporate liability within 
ATS claims. 
Second, the Trail Smelter principle does not establish a norm 
that is specifically defined and universally abided by out of sense 
of legal obligation so as to make it a recognized principle of 
customary international law. No articulable or discernable 
standards have been established in order to determine what 
conduct would be considered customarily harmful. Additionally, no 
legal obligations exist within the many sources of international law 
that have implemented the Trail Smelter Principle. Instead, these 
documents serve only as guide for the United States that has not 
been historically enforced and is not enough to raise the principle 
to the level of a customary international law. 
Third, even if the Trail Smelter Principle were found to be 
customary international law, the plain language of the ATS 
imposes no obligations against non-governmental actors. Only 
violations with identifiable individual perpetrators should be held 
liable under ATS. Where HexonGlobal is one of many contributors 
to the harm, the principle under Trail Smelter cannot impose 
liability. Ultimately, it is nations, and not individual actors like 
HexonGlobal, that are responsible for any harm caused. 
Fourth, any ATS claim based on the Trail Smelter Principle 
has been displaced by the Clean Air Act (CAA) because the 
Supreme Court has held that any federal common law right to 
reduction of emissions of carbon dioxide falls under the statute. A 
claim based on the ATS is not an exception to this displacement, 
even if Plaintiff does not have an alternative remedy. 
5
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Fifth, no cause of action based on substantive due process and 
the principles of the public trust doctrine exists because there is no 
fundamental right to a stable environment. The doctrine’s 
foundational focus on navigable and tidal waters cannot be 
expanded to encompass the climate atmospheric system because 
the atmosphere is not a public resource that the doctrine can 
govern. Additionally, the government has no affirmative duty to 
ensure a stable environment or protect against actions from 
private parties, and no exception applies to a public trust doctrine 
claim. Even if an affirmative duty could be found, the public trust 
doctrine applies only against the states. 
Finally, both claims made under the ATS and the public trust 
doctrine are properly decided by the courts because they implicate 
traditional areas of judicial concern and do not satisfy the elements 
necessary to find a political question. In evaluating an ATS claim, 
a fact specific analysis allows courts to evaluate individuals’ claims 
despite the politically charged context of the claim. The public trust 
doctrine claim is also justiciable because it rests primarily on 
constitutional grounds 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
This Court should not adopt a new rule under the ATS 
allowing suits for injuries from climate change brought against 
domestic corporations, nor should it allow suits alleging 
substantive due process violations from government inaction on 
climate change based on the public trust doctrine. The district 
court dismissed both claims for failure to state a claim for relief. R. 
at 10–11. Dismissal for failure to state a claim or a cause of action 
is reviewed de novo. Carroll v. Fort James Corp., 470 F.3d 1171, 
1173 (5th Cir. 2006); Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 84 (2d Cir. 2005). 
Because there is no ripe norm of customary international law to 
support Plaintiff’s ATS claim against HexonGlobal, nor is there a 
Fifth Amendment due process right based on the public trust 
doctrine to support Plaintiffs’ claim against the U.S., this Court 
should affirm the dismissal of both claims for failure to state a 
claim for relief. 
I. PLAINTIFF CANNOT BRING AN ALIEN TORT 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol10/iss1/4
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STATUTE CLAIM AGAINST A DOMESTIC CORPORATION 
BECAUSE CORPORATE LIABILITY IS NOT A NORM OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW. 
The Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) grants original jurisdiction 
over “any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 
U.S.C. § 1350 (2018). The ATS is constitutionally based on the idea 
that the law of nations has been adopted as part of the federal 
common law, so any tort arising out of a violation of the law of 
nations arises out of federal law. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 
F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980). This Court should not adopt a new 
rule that Plaintiff can bring an ATS suit against a domestic 
corporation because corporate liability is not a ripe norm under 
customary international law (CIL). Multiple policy and practical 
reasons counsel against corporate liability. The Supreme Court has 
not approved of domestic corporate liability under the ATS. The 
Court should refrain from finding new applications for the ATS 
given the serious implications of expanding its scope. 
A. Corporate Liability is Not a Ripe, Universal Norm 
Under Customary International Law. 
Plaintiff cannot bring an ATS claim against a corporate 
defendant because corporate liability is not sufficiently definite 
and universal as to constitute a clear norm of customary 
international law. Courts may only find jurisdiction for ATS claims 
where the norm of CIL invoked is already “specific, universal, and 
obligatory” as to constitute common law of the United States. Sosa 
v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712, 732 (2004). Norms ripen 
under CIL when there is (1) “general and consistent practice of 
states,” and (2) states follow the practice “from a sense of legal 
obligation,” known as opinio juris. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Co. (Kiobel I), 621 F.3d 111, 131, 139 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting 
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States, § 102(2) (Am. Law Inst. 1987)). Customary international 
law provides both the substance of the cause of action under the 
ATS and the scope of liability, including whether corporations can 
be held liable. See Kiobel I, 621 F.3d at 126; see also Jesner v. Arab 
Bank, P.L.C., 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1402 (2018). In Sosa, the Supreme 
7
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Court specifically questioned whether the norm of corporate 
liability was sufficiently definite under international law. Sosa, 
542 U.S. at 732 n.20. Fourteen years later, the Jesner Court again 
expressed skepticism about the ripeness of the norm of corporate 
liability, urging restraint towards expanding liability under the 
ATS. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1399–1400. If this Court cannot establish 
that a clear, universal norm of corporate liability already exists 
under CIL, it should reject adopting a new rule of liability under 
the ATS. 
1. Traditional sources that courts use to discern 
customary international law do not support a 
norm of corporate liability. 
No norm of corporate liability can yet be derived from the 
traditional sources of evidence that courts use to identify the 
substantive rules of customary international law. Courts look to a 
variety of sources to determine whether state practices have 
ripened into clear norms of CIL: the “customs and usages of 
civilized nations,” “works of jurists and commentators” 
experienced in the relevant practices, and judicial tribunals 
“recognizing and enforcing” these customs. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 
880–81 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)). 
The Second Circuit in Kiobel I conducted a thorough investigation 
of these sources, and the Supreme Court lauded its analysis and 
precisely tracked its examples in Jesner. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 
1396–1402. 
An exhaustive review of the major international tribunals, the 
work of “publicists” (commentators), and possibly relevant treaties 
finds no “discernible, much less universal” agreement among 
states that corporations are liable for violations of customary 
international law. Kiobel I, 621 F.3d at 145. First, no international 
tribunal has ever found a corporation liable for a violation of CIL. 
Id. at 132. The prominent tribunals representing agreed norms of 
international law have limited jurisdiction to exclude corporations 
or “legal persons.” Julian G. Ku, The Curious Case of Corporate 
Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: A Flawed System of Judicial 
Lawmaking, 51 Va. J. Int’l L. 353, 379 (2011). The International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the Nuremberg Tribunals all 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol10/iss1/4
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reject jurisdiction over corporations, with the Nuremberg trials 
explicitly charging corporate executives as individuals, rather than 
exerting jurisdiction over the company itself. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 
1400–01; Kiobel I, 621 F.3dat 133–37; Ku, supra, at 380–82. 
Additionally, the two major world courts, the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC), only 
assert jurisdiction over individuals and not over corporations. 
Kiobel I, 621 F.3d at 136–37, 139–40. Proposals to include 
corporate liability in the Rome Statute, establishing the ICC’s 
jurisdiction, were rejected because of a “deep divergence” in views 
on the issue. Id. at 137. Second, where individual treaties have 
subjected corporations to liability, they are limited to their subject 
matter and are not evidence of a broad norm under CIL. Id. at 138. 
The ICJ has specifically stated that corporate liability in a 
“handful of specialized treaties cannot be said to have a 
‘fundamental norm-creating character.’” Id. at 139. Third, the work 
of scholars leans against a norm of corporate liability, despite being 
less homogenous than previous sources. Id. at 143–45, 144 n.48. 
Most proponents of corporate liability write to provide normative 
support for the idea, rather than describing the current state of 
CIL. Id. at 144 n.48; Ku, supra, at 374. Scholars that support 
corporate liability often cite the assessment of scholarly work in 
Judge Leval’s concurrence in Kiobel I, but he concludes that the 
rules of international law “do not provide for any form of liability 
of corporations.” Kiobel I, 621 F.3d at 181–86 (Leval, J., 
concurring). Taken together, the primary sources courts use as 
evidence for finding universal norms under CIL do not 
demonstrate a ripe norm of corporate liability. 
2. This Court should adopt the Second Circuit’s 
approach and is not bound to follow other 
circuits that have found liability. 
This Court should align itself with the Second Circuit and find 
corporate liability is not ripe under international law, despite the 
presence of a circuit split. Supreme Court dicta in Sosa and Jesner 
clearly lean towards the Second Circuit’s finding of no norm of 
corporate liability, in opposition to the findings by the Seventh, 
Ninth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits. Jesner, 138 S. 
Ct. at 1396 (citing Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 
9
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1013, 1017–21 (7th Cir. 2011); Doe v. Nestle USA (Doe I), 766 F.3d 
1013, 1020–22 (9th Cir. 2014); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (Doe III), 
654 F.3d 11, 40–55 (D.C. Cir. 2011)); Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734–36; 
Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008). 
This Court should adopt the position that most closely reflects the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, while avoiding compounding the 
errors reached by other circuits. Circuits finding corporate liability 
under the ATS have erred in multiple ways, including: (1) 
declaring a rule of CIL where one is not actually universally 
accepted; (2) considering themselves “bound” by previous cases 
that did not address the legal issue and thus have no precedential 
weight; or (3) relying on a faulty distinction between international 
substantive obligations and domestically authorized remedies. 
These problematic approaches explain the major ATS decisions in 
most other circuits. First, the Sosa Court instructed lower courts 
to avoid “seek[ing] out and defin[ing] new and debatable 
violations” of CIL. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728. However, several circuits 
do just that by relying on the absence of a universal norm barring 
corporate liability, rather affirmatively finding than the presence 
of a universal norm supporting liability—in essence, “gap-filling” 
where CIL is difficult to determine. Ku, supra, at 391. This error 
reflects the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Doe I, finding that “the 
absence of decisions finding corporations liable does not imply that 
corporate liability is a legal impossibility.” Doe I, 766 F.3d at 1021 
(emphasis added). Second, no precedent binds future courts when 
cases do not affirmatively resolve the legal issues that “merely lurk 
in the record.” Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1418 n.4 (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring). Some courts “did not analyze the question at all” in 
ATS suits brought against corporations. Ku, supra, at 366–67. 
When a court passes on a jurisdictional issue “sub silentio,” other 
courts are not required to follow those decisions in a later case. 
Kiobel I, 621 F.3d at 124 (majority opinion). The Eleventh Circuit’s 
ATS rule in Romero developed in this fashion, holding that it was 
“bound” by the precedent of corporate liability established in 
Aldana, even though that opinion did not analyze corporate 
liability at all. Romero, 552 F.3d at 1315 (citing Aldana v. Del 
Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1242 (11th Cir. 
2005)). Third, the Supreme Court rejected the distinction that CIL 
provides the substantive legal rights under the ATS, while 
domestic law provides the remedies. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1402 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol10/iss1/4
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(majority opinion). The Seventh Circuit incorrectly relied on this 
distinction in Flomo. 643 F.3d at 1020– 21 (finding “no objection” 
to corporate civil liability because a few treaties authorize 
variation in domestic enforcement methods). This Court is not 
bound to adopt one circuit court’s rule over another, and it should 
not follow a circuit whose inquiry into the substantive provisions 
of CIL is lacking. 
B. The Practical Concerns Raised by a New Rule 
Imposing Domestic Corporate Liability Outweigh 
the Potential Benefits and Alternatives Exist for 
Plaintiff. 
A new rule imposing domestic corporate liability under the 
ATS raises serious practical concerns for courts that warrant 
judicial caution. Adjudicating ATS claims against domestic 
corporations poses difficulties for courts resolving disputes when 
the underlying international law norms provide minimal direction. 
Further, Plaintiff has sufficient alternative forms of relief. 
First, practical problems will arise for courts adjudicating ATS 
claims against corporate defendants because there are few 
examples under CIL for courts to look at for substantive legal 
guidance. For example, international law has yet to develop clear 
standards for vicarious liability as it applies in a civil context. Ku, 
supra, at 388. Courts struggle with evaluating agency theories of 
liability given “the utter lack of customary international law 
standards for ‘piercing the corporate veil.’” Ku, supra, at 388. How 
would courts determine the mens rea of a corporation for an intent 
crime? Is liability imputed to shareholders of publicly traded 
companies? How would civil or criminal punishments be imposed 
on a corporation? CIL does not have clear norms of corporate 
liability to answer these questions. See Ku, supra, at 389. Seeking 
answers invites the judicial experimentation the Supreme Court 
cautions against. 
Second, this Court does not need to adventure into fashioning 
new rules because foreign plaintiffs can already bring ATS suits 
directly against individuals for actions taken while working for a 
corporation. Rejecting domestic liability, the Second Circuit noted 
that “individual liability under the ATS is wholly consistent” with 
rejecting a rule of corporate liability. Kiobel I, 621 F.3d at 148. ATS 
11
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suits can be brought against individuals who violate international 
law, including the “employees, managers, officers, and directors of 
a corporation.” Id. at 122. This Court does not need to adopt a new 
rule imposing corporate liability because international law holds 
individuals liable for acts committed under the color of their 
employment. 
II. TRAIL SMELTER IS NOT A RECOGNIZED PRINCIPLE 
OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW BECAUSE IT IS 
NOT SPECIFIC, UNIVERSAL, OR OBLIGATORY. 
Courts define the law of nations by interpreting customary 
international law. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881; Kadic v. 
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995). The burden to establish 
a norm of customary international law is on the party wishing to 
invoke it. Kiobel I, 621 F.3d at 120-21. Customary international 
law only includes “those standards, rules or customs (a) affecting 
the relationships between states or between an individual and a 
foreign state, and (b) used by those states for their common good 
and/or in dealings inter se.” Id. at 118 (emphasis in original). The 
Second Circuit has gone as far as stating that the ATS only applies 
to “shockingly egregious violations of universally recognized 
principles of international law.” Zapata v. Quinn, 707 F.2d 691, 
692 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam). For an offense to violate the law of 
nations, the international norm must be “specific, universal, and 
obligatory.” Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1399. 
A. The Trail Smelter Principle Does Not Establish a 
Norm That is Specifically Defined and Universally 
Abided by States Out of a Sense of Legal 
Obligation. 
The Supreme Court has noted that new principles proffered as 
the present-day law of nations must be “defined with the specificity 
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms [they] 
have recognized.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725 (referring to violation of 
safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and 
piracy). Therefore, for an action to qualify as an offense of the law 
of nations, the basis must be a well-established, universally 
recognized norm of international law.” See id. These customary 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol10/iss1/4
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international laws are only “rules that States universally abide by, 
or accede to, out of a sense of legal obligation and mutual concern.” 
Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 248 (2d Cir. 2003). 
Laws or practices that are “adopted for moral or political 
reasons . . . do not give rise to rules of customary international 
law.” Id. 
A legal norm is not part of customary international law merely 
because it is found in most or all nations. Kiobel I, 621 F.3d at 118. 
A wrong must be “of mutual, and not merely several, concern, by 
means of express international accords” before it is recognizable as 
international law punishable by the ATS. Id. Courts should 
exercise “vigilant doorkeeping” and ensure principles meet a high 
bar before recognizing new private causes of action for violations 
of international law. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1398; Sosa, 542 U.S. at 
729. When doing so, a court must consider the “practical 
consequences of making a cause available to litigants in the federal 
courts.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732–33. 
A proffered legal norm is not specifically defined and 
universally abided by out of a sense of legal obligation so as to 
qualify as a customary international law if it asserts general 
propositions with little to no actual definitions and does not 
establish articulable and discernable standards. See Flores, 414 
F.3d at 233; Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 167 
(5th Cir. 1999). For example, in Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., the 
Second Circuit held that the asserted rights to life and health made 
by plaintiffs who claimed that pollution from an American mining 
company caused their lung disease were “insufficiently definite” to 
qualify as rules of customary international law when the 
statements relied on by the plaintiffs were merely “virtuous goals” 
that did not define what actions fell in or outside the law. 414 F.3d 
at 254–55. Similarly, in Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., the 
Fifth Circuit held that the sources of international law cited by the 
plaintiff in their claim against a mining company for allegedly 
engaging in environmental abuses merely referred to “a general 
sense of environmental responsibility and state abstract rights and 
liberties devoid of articulable and discernable standards.” 197 F.3d 
at 167. 
On the other hand, a legal norm is specific and universally 
abided by out of a sense of legal obligation so as to qualify as a 
13
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customary international law when the norm is explicitly defined 
and sets out standards for what conduct is and is not 
reprehensible. See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 161 (1820); 
Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 317– 19 
(D. Mass. 2013); John Roe I v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 
988, 1020–21 (S.D. Ind. 2007). For example, the Supreme Court in 
United States v. Smith defines piracy, one of the first international 
norms recognized by the Sosa court, as actionable under the ATS. 
18 U.S. at 161. The Court states that there is “no doubt” as to what 
is understood as the crime of piracy, and it analyzes reports from 
several scholars and world leaders, and court cases. Id. at 163 
n.8. Similarly, in John Roe I v. Bridgestone Corp., the court 
addressed the issue of forced child labor on a plantation. 492 F. 
Supp. 2d at 988. The court outlined the explicit standards for the 
minimum age for different types of work in different nations found 
in the International Labour Organization Convention (“ILO 
Convention”). Id. at 1020–21. The U.S. has implemented and 
adhered to these norms through statements from the U.S. 
Department of State, the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), and 
an international convention the U.S. has ratified. Id. at 1020–22. 
The Trail Smelter Principle is not an enforceable rule of 
customary international law because it is merely a virtuous goal, 
devoid of articulable and discernable standards. The 
“responsibility to ensure” that activities in one jurisdiction do not 
harm the environment of another jurisdiction gives no further 
guidance or definition, similar the vague references to a right to 
life or health in Flores. See Flores, 414 F.3d at 245–55; R. at 9. 
Neither the Stockholm Declaration nor the Rio Declaration outline 
explicit standards for the environmental protection process which 
must be implemented, unlike the minimum age for child worker 
standards in the ILO Convention. See Bridgestone, 492 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1020–21. Just as the plaintiff in Beanal relied on the Rio 
Declaration, Plaintiffs cannot show that the treaties implementing 
and reasserting the Trail Smelter Principle “enjoy universal 
acceptance in the international community” or that the treaties 
refer to more than “a general sense of environmental responsibility 
and state abstract rights or liberties devoid of articulable or 
discernable standards and regulations to identify practices that 
constitute international [ ] abuses or torts.” See Beanal, 197 F.3d 
at 167; R. at 9. 
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Finally, the court must consider the practical consequences of 
making this claim available to plaintiffs in federal courts. Sosa, 
542 U.S. at 732. Because the Trail Smelter Principle does not 
outline any standards for which actions are or are not actionable, 
allowing plaintiffs to bring suit for any environmental damage a 
potential defendant may cause to the environment of another State 
would open up the floodgates to a massive amount of litigation. 
Who would be sued next— every car manufacturer who contributes 
to fossil fuels emissions, and every real estate developer who cuts 
down trees and decreases the amount of oxygen they produce? 
Allowing a cause of action in federal courts with such little 
guidance simply is not practical. 
B. The Sources of International Law Implementing the 
Trail Smelter Principle are not Obligatory. 
Courts must interpret the scope of the law of nations based on 
laws as they exist today. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881. When there is 
no treaty, executive, judicial, or legislative act, the law of nations 
is found by “consulting the work of jurists, by following the general 
practice of nations, or by interpreting judicial decisions enforcing 
these laws.” The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700. If declarations 
of international norms are not in and of themselves binding, then 
there must be evidence of state practice showing the norm has 
developed into an obligatory requirement. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 377, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
Agreements under international law implementing a 
purported international norm are not obligatory when they are 
non-self-executing, the U.S. has declined to ratify the document, or 
if the documents are merely aspirational and were never intended 
to be binding. See Flores, 414 F.3d at 233; Peiqing Cong v. 
ConocoPhillips Co., 250 F. Supp. 3d 229, 234–35 (S.D. Tex. 2016); 
Almon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991). For example, in Flores, the Second Circuit found that 
plaintiffs did not demonstrate that the instruments they relied on 
established a legal rule prohibiting pollution when the plaintiffs 
cited to two treaties which have not been ratified by the U.S., one 
treaty the U.S. has specifically declined to ratify, and several 
United Nations (“UN”) General Assembly resolutions which were 
“merely aspirational and were never intended to be binding.” 
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Flores, 414 F.3d at 258–59. Similarly, in Almon Metals, Inc. v. FMC 
Corp., the court found plaintiff’s reliance on the Stockholm 
Principles and Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law 
unpersuasive in their claim that chemicals used in the defendant’s 
manufacturing process created a serious health and environmental 
hazard. 775 F. Supp. at 671. The court stated that the Stockholm 
Principles “do not set forth any specific proscriptions, but rather 
refer only in a general sense to the responsibility of nations,” and 
that the Restatement only iterates the U.S. view of the law of 
nations, not a universal view. Id. at 671. 
In contrast, sources of international law implementing a 
purported international norm are obligatory when the United 
States is a party to a universally accepted treaty or protocol, and 
has taken steps to implement and enforce that norm in the United 
States. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 876; M.C. v. Bianchi, 782 F. Supp. 
2d 127, 131 (E.D. Pa. 2011); Bridgestone, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 988. 
For example, in M.C. v Bianchi, the Optional Protocol on the 
Rights of the Child, Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child 
Pornography, offered by the plaintiffs to show that punishing sex 
trafficking is an international norm, was obligatory because the 
Protocol was ratified by the United States, implemented in the 
United States through two pieces of further legislation, and 
enforced through courts across the United States. 782 F. Supp. 2d 
at 131. Similarly, in Bridgestone, the court found that the 
customary international law norm prohibiting child labor on 
plantations was obligatory even though the U.S. did not ratify the 
ILO Convention because the key source of international child labor 
standards used by the ILO Convention was a Convention which 
the U.S. had ratified, and the U.S. implemented those ideals 
through the FLSA. Bridgestone, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 1020–21. 
In the case at hand, unlike Bianchi, the international sources 
Plaintiff references as implementing the Trail Smelter Principle 
are mere guidance principles and not obligatory so as to raise the 
Principle to the level of a customary international law. See 
Bianchi, 782 F. Supp. 2d at 131. The Trail Smelter Arbitration, the 
source of the Trail Smelter Principle, was a conflict and decision 
between only two countries—United States and Canada. See Trail 
Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1907 (2006). Further, 
the issue addressed by the Trail Smelter Arbitration was a specific 
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source causing a specific type of damage. Id. The type of damage 
Plaintiff claims cannot be exclusively or conclusively linked to 
HexonGlobal because contribute only a fraction of global 
emissions. R. at 5 (HexonGlobal is responsible for six percent of 
global historical emissions). 
The two UN conferences adopting and reasserting the Trail 
Smelter Principle, the Stockholm Conference and the Rio 
Declaration, were actually attended by the U.S., but neither 
document contains any information about enforcement or 
implementation of the Principle. See Almon, 775 F. Supp. at 671; 
U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, 3, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF. 151/26/REV.1 (VOL.1)(1992) [hereinafter Rio 
Declaration]; U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, 
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment, 5, U.N. Doc A/CONF. 48/14/Rev. 1 (June 16, 1972) 
[hereinafter Stockholm Declaration]. . While it is true that the U.S. 
has implemented some of the ideas of the Trail Smelter Principle 
through federal legislation, like the minimum age requirement in 
Bridgestone, this case differs because the United States’ legislation 
on clean air is made out of concern for the United States’ own 
population. See Bridgestone, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 1020–21. The 
express purpose behind the Clean Air Act is, “to protect and 
enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources.” 42 U.S.C. § 7401 
(2018) (emphasis added). In fact, as evidenced by the President’s 
plans to reverse domestic regulatory measures and international 
commitments, the U.S. is in no way obligated to follow the Trail 
Smelter Principle. R. at 7. Entertaining the possibility of 
withdrawing from the Paris Agreement shows that the U.S. is 
concerned with environmental issues within its own country, not 
abroad. See R. at 7. 
III. EVEN IF THE TRAIL SMELTER PRINCIPLE IS A 
NORM OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW, IT DOES 
NOT IMPOSE OBLIGATIONS ENFORCEABLE AGAINST 
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ACTORS SUCH AS 
HEXONGLOBAL. 
The plain language of the ATS does not contain any 
requirement of state action. Bianchi, 782 F. Supp. 2d at 132. The 
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nature and scope of liability is not defined by the ATS, instead it is 
defined by the customary international law being enforced. Kiobel 
I, 621 F.3d at 121–22. This means that international law governs 
the scope of liability for violations of customary international law 
under the ATS, not domestic law. Id. at 126; see Sosa, 542 U.S. at 
732 n.20. Depending on the cause of action, the ATS can find either 
a government or an individual liable. See Kiobel I, 621 F.3d at 120 
(“violations of human rights can be charged against States and 
against individual men and women but not against jurisdictional 
persons such as corporations.”). 
Violations with individual identifiable perpetrators should be 
held liable under the ATS. See Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 
846 (11th Cir. 1996); Chavez v. Carranza, No. 03-2932 M1/P, 2006 
WL 2434934, at *11 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 15, 2006), aff’d, 559 F.3d 486 
(6th Cir. 2009). For example, in Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, the Eleventh 
Circuit affirmed a finding of liability on a former Ethiopian 
government official for the torture and cruel, inhumane treatment 
of the plaintiffs. 72 F.3d at 846. Similarly, in Chavez v. Carranza, 
a suit was properly brought under the ATS against a former 
Salvadoran military officer for the torture and extrajudicial 
killings of plaintiffs and plaintiff’s family members that was 
authorized by the military officer. 2006 WL 2434934, at *1. 
In the case at hand, the Trail Smelter Principle, or the “no-
harm principle” as it is sometimes called, has had limited effect on 
the climate regime. See Benoit Mayer, The Relevance of the No-
Harm Principle to Climate Change Law and Politics, 19 Asia-Pac. 
J. Envtl. L. 79-104, 6 (Oct. 9, 2016). Through the Rio and 
Stockholm Declarations, States across the globe agreed to a 
general goal of ensuring that activities within their jurisdiction do 
not damage the environment of other states, without outlining any 
particulars for how that goal was to be achieved or policed. See Rio 
Declaration; Stockholm Declaration. Additionally, these 
documents do not contain any language identifying who is liable 
for activities that damage the environment of other states. 
Although the original Trail Smelter Arbitration resulted in a 
finding of liability on an individual Canadian company for damage 
caused to individual residents in the U.S., this was a case where 
the source of the harm could be pinpointed to a single company. 
Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1913–19. In the case at 
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hand, HexonGlobal is not like the defendants in Negewo or 
Carranza because HexonGlobal is a single contributor to an 
activity rather than the sole contributor. See Negewo, 72 F.3d at 
846; Carranza, 2006 WL 2434934, at *11. HexonGlobal is only 
responsible for six percent of global historical emissions. R. at 5. 
This means that other parties are responsible for ninety-four 
percent of the cause of Plaintiff’s alleged harm. 
Finally, in an advisory opinion by the International Court of 
Justice, the court reinforces the idea that it is States who are 
responsible for violations of the Trail Smelter Principle, not 
individual actors. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶ 29 (July 8). 
The court states that it is an “obligation of States to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the 
environment of other States.” Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, the 
Trail Smelter Principle does not create a cause of action 
enforceable against private actors such as HexonGlobal. If anyone 
were to be liable for Plaintiff’s alleged harm, it would be the U.S. 
government, not HexonGlobal. 
IV. THE CLEAN AIR ACT DISPLACES ANY ATS CLAIM 
BASED ON THE TRAIL SMELTER PRINCIPLE 
This Court should affirm the district court’s dismissal of 
Plaintiff’s ATS claim based on the Trail Smelter Principle because 
the Clean Air Act displaces the cause of action. R. at 9–10. The 
Supreme Court in American Electric Power held that the Clean Air 
Act (“CAA”) displaces any federal common law right to seek 
abatement for emissions of carbon dioxide, mirroring its Clean 
Water Act cases. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut (AEP), 564 
U.S. 410, 424 (2011). When Congress enacts a comprehensive 
regulatory scheme to address a specific harm, any federal common 
law cause of action addressing that harm is displaced by statute. 
Id. at 419. As in AEP, Plaintiff’s ATS claim based on federal 
common law is displaced by the CAA. No factor distinguishes an 
ATS claim from any other claim at common law to render the 
Court’s prevailing jurisprudence inapplicable. In fact, multiple 
courts have grounded their displacement analysis in the Supreme 
Court’s treatment of the federal common law in ATS cases. Courts 
have also found common law cause of actions are displaced 
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regardless of the type of remedy sought, whether or not the 
legislation allows the plaintiff to bring a cause of action to enforce 
the displacing statute. This Court should find that Plaintiff’s ATS 
suit is displaced even if Plaintiff cannot seek alternative relief 
under the CAA. R. at 10. 
A. Plaintiff’s ATS Suit to Limit Emissions is Displaced 
by the CAA Under the Rule Established in AEP. 
Plaintiff’s ATS suit based on the Trail Smelter Principle is 
displaced by the Clean Air Act, eliminating any source of redress 
based on federal common law rights of action to limit emissions. 
AEP, 564 U.S. at 424. Courts resort to applying federal common 
law only “in absence” of an applicable statute. City of Milwaukee v. 
Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 314 (1981). When Congress 
addresses a question previously governed by federal common law, 
the need for Court rulemaking “disappears.” Id. The test for 
displacement asks whether the statute “‘speak[s] directly to [the] 
question’ at issue.” AEP, 564 U.S. at 424 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. 
v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978)). The AEP Court held 
the CAA displaces any federal common law right to seek emissions 
limits because the Act provides specific avenues for enforcement, 
thus making judicial imposition of emissions limits inappropriate. 
Id. at 425–28. 
AEP’s displacement analysis applies to Plaintiff’s claim 
because the ATS is purely a jurisdictional statute and does not 
itself create any cause of action. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714; R. at 9–
10. In both its ATS and displacement cases, the Supreme Court 
relies on the primacy of congressional lawmaking to determine 
where a cause of action exists at federal common law. AEP, 564 
U.S. at 426; Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727. Courts should not entertain 
causes of action when Congress has provided a remedy or 
contemplated other methods of redress outside of the ATS. Jesner, 
138 S. Ct. at 1402. Lower courts have also specifically applied ATS 
jurisprudence to their displacement analysis when finding the 
CAA has displaced a cause of action. City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 
325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (citing Jesner, 138 S. Ct. 
at 1402); City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1024–
25, 1028–29 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (citing Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1402; 
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728). 
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Plaintiff’s cause of action is similar to the cases where lower 
courts found that CAA displacement applies to all possible 
remedies, regardless of the manner in which a defendant 
contributed to global emissions. See Native Village of Kivalina v. 
ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 857–58 (9th Cir. 2012); City of 
New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 474–76; City of Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 
3d at 1025, 1028; R. at 8–9. First, Plaintiff alleges harms from 
HexonGlobal’s production and sale fossil fuels, like the claim held 
displaced by the CAA in City of New York. 325 F. Supp. 3d at 476; 
R. at 8–9. In City of New York, the plaintiff’s cause of action was 
still displaced by the CAA even though the injury alleged was 
defendants’ “worldwide production, marketing, and sale of fossil 
fuels,” rather than the CAA’s main target for regulation—current 
emissions from power plants. 325 F. Supp. 3d at 474–75. Second, a 
court’s displacement analysis does not change based on the type of 
relief sought. Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 857. When Congress displaces 
a cause of action, all remedies that flow from it are also displaced. 
Id. The CAA thus displaces claims for damages and injunctive 
relief. Id. at 857–58 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 
528-29 (2007)). In this case, Plaintiff seeks both damages and 
injunctive relief, which are displaced. R. at 3. 
B. This Court Should Find Displacement by the CAA 
Even if Plaintiff Lacks an Alternative Remedy. 
Potential legal objections to displacement of ATS claims based 
on a congressional intent or a lack of remedy for Plaintiff are not 
persuasive. First, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that a 
clear or express statement of displacement from Congress is 
necessary for the courts to find the CAA displaces a federal 
common law right of action. AEP, 564 U.S. at 423–24. Enacting a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme is itself sufficient to show 
Congress has “occupied the field.” Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 317–
18. Second, availability of a federal remedy may be a factor in a 
court’s initial displacement analysis, but lack of a remedy alone 
does not justify any exceptions once a court finds statutory 
displacement. Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 857. The “comprehensive 
nature” of the CAA means Congress has spoken on the remedies 
available for emissions, and “the lack of a federal damages remedy 
is not indicative of a gap which federal common law must fill.” Id. 
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at 866 (Pro, J., concurring). Neither the Supreme Court nor the 
Ninth Circuit found lack of a remedy for the plaintiff alone is 
sufficient to overwhelm the court’s finding of displacement. AEP, 
564 U.S. at 422–23; Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 857 (majority opinion). 
Third, the “nonrestriction of other rights” language in the CAA’s 
citizen suit provision does not imply that a federal common law 
cause of action remains generally available. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) 
(2018). The Supreme Court held the Clean Water Act “as a whole” 
displaces common law causes of action that might exist outside its 
citizen suit provision, and the same is true for the CAA’s citizen 
suit provision, which is worded identically to the Clean Water Act. 
Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 861 (Pro, J., concurring) (quoting Milwaukee 
II, 451 U.S. at 328–29). Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (2018) (Clean 
Water Act’s citizen suit nonrestriction of remedy clause) with 42 
U.S.C. § 7604(e) (Clean Air Act’s citizen suit clause). 
This Court should thus affirm the district court’s holding that 
Plaintiff’s cause of action is displaced by the CAA. R. at 9–10. The 
Supreme Court’s displacement analysis finds no exception for a 
claim based on the ATS or brought by a plaintiff who may be denied 
the ability to bring an enforcement under the CAA. 
V. NO SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CAUSE OF ACTION 
EXISTS UNDER THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTINE 
BECAUSE THERE IS NO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO A 
STABLE ENVIRONMENT, NOR AN AFFIRMATIVE DUTY 
TO PROTECT THE GLOBAL CLIMATE SYSTEM. 
No substantive due process right to a stable environment can 
be found through the foundation of the public trust doctrine, as the 
doctrine does not implicate the entirety of the climate system, it 
does not apply to the federal government, and the government has 
not caused any of the harm that would create a duty to protect the 
global climate system. Any Fifth Amendment cause of action bases 
itself on the deprivation of the interests of life, liberty, and 
property. U.S. Const. amend. V. The public trust doctrine 
fundamentally functions to protect certain property interests, but 
does not serve as a basis for a claim that Plaintiff’s Fifth 
Amendment right to property has been infringed. 
Grounded first in Roman civil law and English common law, 
the public trust doctrine considers things like air, running water, 
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the sea, and the seashore to be in a common trust available to all 
under natural law. J. Inst. 2.1.1. (J.B. Moyle trans.); Ill. Cent. R.R. 
Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1982). The doctrine focuses on the 
idea that a sovereign government, such as a state government, 
cannot grant away the title it holds to its natural resources that 
are stored in a public trust for current and future beneficiaries. Ill. 
Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 452. In American common law, the 
doctrine has been strictly limited in its application to determining 
the state’s property rights in submerged lands under navigable and 
tidal waters. Phillips Petroleum v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 473–
76 (1988). The state’s ownership of these lands was found to be a 
public trust and thus had to be compatible with the public interest 
that favored public access to the lands. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. 
at 435; Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1894). The limited 
scope in which the doctrine has been applied, primarily to states, 
cannot be applied here to create a fundamental right to a stable 
climate through incorporation in the Due Process Clause, nor can 
it be used to obligate the government to protect against actions by 
private parties. 
A. The Public Trust Doctrine Does Not Create a Cause 
of Action Through the Due Process Clause Because 
Its Principles Cannot Be Expanded to Find a Basis 
for a Fundamental Right to Protect the Global 
Climate System. 
The public trust doctrine does not create a fundamental right 
to a stable climate because the doctrine cannot properly be 
expanded to protect the entire global climate atmospheric system. 
Excluding the single exception of the recent Oregon district court 
decision in Juliana v. United States, no court has so broadly 
applied the public trust doctrine, limiting it to its primary focus on 
the public’s interests in navigation and commerce. United States v. 
Mission Rock Co., 189 U.S. 391, 407 (1903); Juliana v. United 
States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1250 (D. Or. 2016), motion to certify 
appeal denied, No. 6:15-CV-01517-TC, 2017 WL 2483705, at *1–2 
(D. Or. June 8, 2017). State common law applications of the 
doctrine, even in the broadest cases, have still focused specifically 
on the public’s right to water resources. See Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. 
v. Cal. Dep’t of Forestry & Fire Prot., 187 P.3d 888, 926 (Cal. 2008) 
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(extending the doctrine to “the planning and allocation of water 
resources”); Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside Partners, 140 P.3d 985, 1002 
(Haw. 2006) (applying Hawaii’s public trust doctrine to all water 
resources in the state). 
The public trust doctrine even in its most expansive form 
cannot be applied to find a fundamental right to a stable climate 
because the atmosphere, and by extension the global atmospheric 
climate, is not a public use resource over which the doctrine can 
govern. The novel conception of the entire atmospheric climate 
system, a resource that exists within no confined bounds and is 
affected by acts in every nation and jurisdiction, exceeds the scope 
of the doctrine. See Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 
1143 (9th Cir. 2013). Additionally, the atmosphere is not a resource 
that is exhaustible and irreplaceable, which the public trust 
doctrine was developed to and has historically addressed. See 
Chernaik v Brown, No. 16-11-09273, 2015 WL 12591229, at *7 
(Or.Cir. May 11, 2015) (citing Morse v. Oregon Div. of State Lands, 
581 P.2d 520, 523 (Or. Ct. App. 1978), aff’d, 590 P.2d 709 (1979)). 
The only case that found a basis for a fundamental right to 
stable climate through the public trust principles, Juliana, 
improperly expanded the public trusts doctrine’s principles. The 
court found a fundamental right to a climate system capable of 
sustaining human life. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1250. However, 
the court did not address the question of whether the atmosphere 
was a public trust asset at that stage in litigation. Id. at 1255. The 
court instead found that there was a public trust violation in the 
territorial sea that related to the plaintiff’s injury. Id. at 1256. 
Here, despite Plaintiff’s alleged injuries relating to claims 
regarding waters, they assert a fundamental right to the entirety 
of a stable environment that exceeds the narrow scope of the 
violation found by the Juliana court. See id. The court did not 
address the right to a stable environment in the context of the 
atmosphere or consider the entire climate as a public trust right, 
instead relying primarily on an amalgamation of due process 
rights, such as a fundamental right to privacy. See id. at 1249–51. 
The singular holding of this court cannot be a basis to expand the 
public trust doctrine to grant a protection of a fundamental right 
to the atmospheric climate system as a whole. 
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B. The Government has No Affirmative Duty to Ensure 
a Stable Environment by Protecting Against 
Private Party Actions and it Played No Role in 
Creating the Danger. 
The Due Process Clause cannot support Plaintiff’s cause of 
action because it imposes no duty on the government to 
affirmatively act to protect the environment, and no exception 
applies because government did not create the danger. The 
Supreme Court held that there is no affirmative duty for 
government protection to address actions that have allegedly been 
committed by private parties. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t 
of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989). Even if the claim were to 
implicate securing liberty, life, or property interests, the Due 
Process Clause does not compel the government to act or 
affirmatively confer aid. Id. at 196-200. The Ninth Circuit has 
applied an exception to this rule when the government has created 
the danger that impacts due process. Id. at 201; Penilla v. City of 
Huntington Park, 115 F.3d 707, 709–10 (9th Cir. 1997). The 
elements for establishing government created danger are: (1) the 
government’s acts created the danger to the plaintiff; (2) the 
government knew its acts caused the danger; and (3) the 
government with deliberate indifference failed to act to prevent the 
alleged harm. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1252 (quoting Penilla, 
115 F.3d at 709); L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119, 121 (9th Cir. 1992). 
None of these elements are met in this case. This government 
indifference must be the product of a culpable mental state and not 
just gross negligence. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1251 (citing 
Pauluk v. Savage, 836 F.3d 1117, 1125 (9th Cir. 2016)). 
The Ninth Circuit applied this danger creation exception 
without DeShaney’s emphasis on the duty of care being triggered 
when a person is in custody. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201; Grubbs, 
974 F.2d at 121 (finding that custody of victim was not a 
prerequisite for danger creation to apply where security custodial 
was raped and terrorized by inmate), Penilla, 115 F.3d at 710 
(finding that officers were deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff’s 
safety and placing him in danger by removing him from the 
potential of medical care). These exceptions significantly 
broadened DeShaney’s original exception, only in these extreme 
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cases and do not provide a basis for a broad application of a 
government caused danger exception. 
In this case, even if the government caused danger exception 
test was applied, the elements of the exception would not be met, 
as the U.S. government did not actively create the danger, 
particularly after becoming aware of the potential harm. When the 
majority of the harmful emissions were being produced, the 
government had no knowledge of the dangers of climate change. R. 
at 6. Additionally, the government did not act culpably or with 
deliberate indifference to prevent the harm. Instead, beginning as 
early as 1992, the government has worked to adopt policies and 
take measures specifically designed to mitigate climate change and 
its effects, like establishing fuel economy standards and 
greenhouse gases emission limits for passenger cars. R. at 6-7. The 
government caused danger exception does not apply, and the 
government has no affirmative duty to protect a stable climate 
both under DeShaney and because there is no expansion of the 
public trust doctrine that can incorporate protecting the entire 
climate as a substantive due process right. 
C. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
Provides No Basis for a Public Trust Doctrine Suit 
Against the Federal Government Because the 
Doctrine Only Applies to State Governments 
The public trust doctrine imposes no duties upon the federal 
government because it applies to state laws and state actors. Even 
if a fundamental right or an exception to DeShaney is found, the 
public trust doctrine’s historical incorporation into American law 
only obligates state government action and does not broadly create 
a federal cause of action. In the seminal case considering the 
application of the public trust doctrine, Illionis Central, the 
Supreme Court used the public trust doctrine to void the sale of 
submerged land in Chicago harbor because the sale would harm 
public interest. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co, 146 U.S. at 451–53. The Court 
has made clear that the application of the public trust doctrine in 
this case was “a statement of Illinois law” and not a statement of 
federal law, limiting the doctrine’s application to solely be against 
the state. Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 395 (1926). 
The Supreme Court recognizes that the public trust doctrine is not 
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based on the Constitution, but rather that it “remains a matter of 
state law” with no application to the federal government. See Alec 
L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 F. App’x 7, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(citing PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1235 
(2012)); see also Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 
261, 284–88 (1997) (treating the public trust doctrine as a matter 
of state law); Phillips, 484 U.S. at 473–76 (similar). Though the 
public trust doctrine has been implicated in some federal actions 
regarding navigable and tidal waters, it has largely developed 
almost exclusively as a matter of state law. Phillips, 484 U.S. at 
476; District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1082 
(D.C. Cir. 1984). The courts that have applied the public trust 
doctrine against the federal government applied it only in narrow 
situations that are not relevant to this case. City of Alameda v. 
Todd Shipyards, 635 F. Supp. 1447, 1450 (N.D. Cal. 1986); United 
States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 124 (D. Mass. 1981). 
In these cases, the court focused solely on submerged lands and 
held that where the U.S. has title to these lands, the transfer of it 
does not violate the public trust doctrine that was applicable to it 
under state law. City of Alameda, 635 F. Supp. at 1450; 1.58 Acres 
of Land, 523 F. Supp. at 124. The application of the public trust 
doctrine to the federal government in these cases still rested on the 
original federal application to navigable and tidal waters, 
providing no ground for broader expansion of the doctrine against 
the federal government. See Alec L., 561 F. App’x at 8. Allowing 
public trust principles to support a claim  against the federal 
government expands the doctrine past its intended scope to apply 
solely to state governments, and so the doctrine cannot provide a 
federal cause of action. 
VI. THE LAW OF NATIONS CLAIM UNDER THE ALIEN 
TORT STATUTE AND THE PUBLIC TRUST CLAIM ARE 
JUSTICIABLE QUESTIONS BECAUSE CONSTITUTIONAL 
AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION ARE PROPERLY 
ADJUDICATED BY THE COURTS 
Plaintiffs’ claims under the Alien Tort Statute and Public 
Trust Doctrine are justiciable political questions because the 
issues addressed in each fall within the role of the judiciary, and 
neither claim constitutes a political question under the factors of 
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Baker v. Carr. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 215–18 (1962). The 
political question doctrine reflects the essential nature of the 
separation of powers within a democracy by assigning different 
duties to each branch of government. Id. Issues deemed to be 
essentially political in nature cannot be decided by federal courts 
as the courts lack subject matter jurisdiction. Id. 
In Baker, the Supreme Court established six factors to 
determine the presence of a political question: (1) a textually 
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department; (2) a lack of judicially discoverable 
and manageable standards for resolving it; (3) the impossibility of 
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly 
for nonjudicial discretion; (4) the impossibility of a court’s 
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the 
respect due coordinate branches of government; (5) an unusual 
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already 
made; or (6) the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious 
pronouncements by various departments on one question. Id. at 
217. These six Baker factors are used to guide a case-by-case 
analysis that often collapses some of the individual factors 
together. Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 544 (9th Cir. 
2005). Only when one of these factors is wholly inseparable from 
the case should the court dismiss it as a nonjusticable political 
question. Id. A case involving political issues or actions is not 
automatically nonjusticiable. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce v. Montana, 
503 U.S. 442, 458 (1992). 
A. Public Trust Doctrine Claims are Justiciable 
Because They Allege Violations of Constitutional 
Rights That are Properly Adjudicated by the 
Courts 
Courts have proper jurisdiction over claims made under the 
Public Trust Doctrine because the doctrine does not specifically 
implicate other branches of government, and the claim relies on 
Constitutional foundations. Claims under the public trust 
necessarily implicate both the executive and legislative branches, 
through legislation and regulations of the assets within the public 
trust, but the doctrine does not direct a specific action or process to 
fulfill its protections. Michael C. Blumm & Mary Christina Wood, 
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“No Ordinary Lawsuit”: Climate Change, Due Process, and the 
Public Trust Doctrine, 67 Am. U. L. Rev. 1, 43–48 (2017). However, 
these claims also implicate the judicial branch because the courts 
have a role in protecting the beneficiaries of the public trust by 
holding the legislative and executive branches accountable. Ariz. 
Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 169 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1991); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine 
Cnty., 658 P.2d 709, 731–32 (Cal. 1983). Court intervention on 
behalf of these beneficiaries does not impose policy decisions on the 
other branches of governments, but enforces the obligations 
already owed. Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 440. 
Public trust claims made within the context of climate change 
do not impact the court’s authority to adjudicate the claim, as 
public trust claims do not violate any of the six Baker factors that 
set a high bar for courts to dismiss claims as nonjusticiable. Baker, 
369 U.S. at 217. In the most recent public trust doctrine claim in 
the context of the climate, the Juliana court found that the claim 
did not raise a political question. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1235–
42. The Constitution has not textually allocated fundamental 
power over managing public trust resources to any particular 
branch, and the courts regularly adjudicate cases about the 
climate, thereby satisfying the first Baker factor. Id. at 1238. 
Public trust claims do not rest solely on statutory or regulatory 
frameworks, instead focusing largely on the beneficiaries of the 
public trust through examination of the constitutional rights that 
affect those beneficiaries. Id. at 1238–40. Constitutional 
interpretation is a traditional area of purview of the courts, and 
resolving the scope of these rights does not require an initial policy 
decision that would create a political question. Id. Courts therefore 
have competence to hear public trust claims consistent with the 
second and third Baker factors because the claim rests on a 
constitutional claim of a deprivation of property, and does not 
require initial policy decisions from the courts. Id. at 1239. It is 
rare that the final three factors will make a case nonjusticable. 
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotosfsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 203–04 
(2012). In analyzing the factors, the court in Juliana found that 
none rendered the issue of a public trust claim a nonjusticable 
question. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1240–41. 
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Where courts have found that the political question doctrine 
bars the courts adjudication of a climate change case, the rulings 
improperly diminished the appropriate role of the judiciary. See 
Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227, 1236 (11th 
Cir. 2004) (“Federal courts adjudicate claims against foreign 
corporations every day and can consider the nation’s foreign policy 
interests and international comity concerns in their decisions”); Aji 
P. v. State, No. 18-2-04448-1, 2018 WL 3978310, at *1 
(Wash.Super. Aug. 14, 2018). In Aji P., the court found a policy-
making prerogative in the climate action plan that encroached on 
the roles of the two political branches of government. Aji P., 2018 
WL 3978310, at *3. Additionally, the political question doctrine 
has mostly barred adjudication in cases implicating the Executive 
Branch’s authority over foreign relations. Id. However, here, 
environmental policy under the public trust doctrine is not an 
inherently a foreign policy decision, nor is it relegated to the 
legislature. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1241. Some remedies 
would require specific care to avoid separation of powers conflicts, 
but the legal issues themselves are still properly addressed by the 
courts. Id. at 1241–42. This public trust doctrine claim is properly 
justiciable because the traditional role of the judiciary is to 
interpret constitutional rights, protection of public trusts are not 
exclusively relegated to any one branch of government, and no 
other Baker factors suggest this case is non- justiciable. 
B. The ATS Claim is Not Barred by the Political 
Question Doctrine Because Interpreting the Scope 
of the Law of Nations and Federal Causes of 
Action are Traditional Judicial Functions. 
The Alien Tort Statute claim does presents a justiciable 
question for the courts because courts have historically adjudicated 
ATS claims based on a case specific analysis and prioritization of 
concurrent jurisdiction where claims have not been allocated to a 
specific governmental branch. Law of nations claims under the 
ATS, due to their inherent nature of international law, may have 
implications on the country’s foreign relations. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 
248–49. However, courts have routinely found that ATS claims are 
within the judiciary’s proper role because claims that rise in a 
politically charged context does not convert the claim necessarily 
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into a non-justiciable political question. Jewel v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 
673 F.3d 902, 912 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding no political question in 
an ATS claim involving electronic surveillance); Klinghoffer v. 
S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1991); Planned 
Parenthood Fed’n of Am, Inc. v. Agency for Int’l Dev., 838 F.2d 649, 
656 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding the political question doctrine did not 
bar an ATS claim based on international funding for birth control 
and abortion). Though the Sosa Court, in dicta, advocates for a 
cautious judicial approach in addressing ATS claims so as to avoid 
interfering with the political branches, lower courts have routinely 
decided the merits of these cases, particularly when claims are 
based on infractions by an individual. Alperin, 410 F.3d at 545; 
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728. The ATS allows for judicial review by 
authorizing courts to hear claims by individuals for violations of 
international norms. Amy Endicott, The Judicial Answer? 
Treatment of the Political Question Doctrine in Alien Tort Claims, 
28 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 537, 551 (2010). 
Courts have found in the majority of cases that when applying 
a fact-specific analysis of ATS law of nations claims, the political 
question doctrine does not apply. See Doe III, 654 F.3d at 11; 
Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1151 n.4 (11th Cir. 2011). In 
these cases, courts found that even though there were executive 
branch foreign policy decisions implicated, these were insufficient 
to render the claims nonjusticable. See Doe III, 654 F.3d at 11; 
Mamani, 654 F.3d at 1151. Where courts have found the political 
question doctrine renders an ATS case nonjusticable, they found 
that it would require courts to directly decide national policy, 
infringing on powers committed to the other branches. See 
Gonzalez-Vera v. Kissinger, 449 F.3d 1260, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
(holding court evaluation of measures taken by the U.S. to 
implement U.S. policy in Chile would require policy decision 
textually allocated to political branches); Robertson v. Republic of 
Nicaragua, No. 17-cv-00852-JST, 2017 WL 2730177, *4 (N.D. Cal. 
2017) (finding plaintiff’s complaint would require adjudication of 
200 years of relationship between a people and a sovereign 
government). Here, climate change has been addressed by all 
branches and is not committed to a single branch or specific policy 
approach, and thus is not subject to the political question doctrine 
under the fact-specific elements of this claim. 
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In applying the Baker factors, the Second Circuit in Kadic held 
that the specific, statutory jurisdictional grant over ATS claims 
satisfies the first three Baker factors. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249. 
Existence of discoverable and manageable judicial standards in 
ATS claims removes the need for the court to make policy 
decisions. Id. Cases that touch on foreign relations are weighed on 
a case-by-case basis to assess if judicial action is appropriate. Id. 
The remaining Baker factors need only be addressed if the judicial 
resolution of a question would contradict previous decisions made 
by other branches. Id. at 249–50. Considering both the general 
context of ATS claims and the specific case analysis required by 
the Baker factors, Plaintiff’s law of nations claim does not implicate 
the political question doctrine and can be properly decided by the 
judiciary. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant HexonGlobal respectfully 
requests this court to affirm the District Court’s decision 
dismissing claims under the Alien Tort Statute and Fifth 
Amendment for failure to state a claim for relief. 
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